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Are we free? What does "freedom" mean here? In the following, I shall only
focus with freedom oi action. My main thesis is that there is not just one
basic type of free action but more. Philosophers, howeverl tend to assume
that there is just one way to act freely. Hence, a more detailed analysis oi
free action is being called foro I will distinguish between different kinds of
free action and discuss the relations between them. The analysis of different
types of coercion will lead to a different view on freedom -a view wruch
stresses the many faces of free action-.
Keywords: coercion, exploitation, freedom of action, freedom of will,
interference, offers, threats.
Resumen: La coerción y las variedades de la acción libre
¿Somos libres? ¿Qué significa "libertad" en este caso? En el siguiente artí-
culo, me enfocaré solamente en la libertad de acción. Mi tesis principal es
que no hay sólo un tipo de acción libre, sino varios. Los filósofos, sin
embargo, tienden a asumir que sólo hay una manera de actuar libremente.
Por lo tanto, es preciso realizar un análisis más detallado de la acción libre.
Distinguiré tipos diferentes de acciones libres y discutiré las relaciones
entre ellos. El análisis de tipos diferentes de coerción; conducirá a una
visión diferente de la libertad -una visión que resalta las variadas facetas
de la acción Ubre-o
Palabras claves: coerción, explotación, libertad de acción, libertad de vo-
luntad, interferencia, ofrecimiento, amenaza.
A re we free? TItis question is very important but also quite broadand vague: What does JJfreedom" mean here? It is useful to
distinguish two main types oí freedom: freedom of action and freedom
oí the will. Bere is an explanation of this traditionaI distinction by a
more recent writer~Harry Frankfurt:
[...] freedom of action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do
what one wants to do. AnalogouslYI then, the statement that a
person enjoys freedom of the will means [...] that he is free to wiU
what he wants to wi1l~ or to have the will he wants. (Frankfurt
1988c: 20)1
Artículo recibido: octubre de 2002. Aceptado: marzo de 2003.
1 The expression "free will" is oiten also used for what Frankfurt calls 11free
action". Here, I will follow Frankfurt's tenninology.
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Ifwe replace the over-generalized question whether we are free by
more specific ones we have better chances to find interesting and use-
fuI answers. Hence, let us ask instead: Do we enjoy free will? What
does it mean to have a 11free will"? Are we capable of free action? What
makes an action a free action? In the following, 1shall deal with the
last question only (henee, not with freedom oí the will in the above
sense). My main thesis is that there is not just one basic type oí free
action but more. Philosophers, however, tend to assume that there is
just one way to act freely. According to e.E. Moore, for ínstance, an act
of mine is free if 1eould have done otherwise (e! Moore 1958: 122ff).
Much of the ensuing discussion about free action has iocussed on this
11conditionaI" aspect,2 -assuming that there is just one sense in which
my act can be called 11free" -. 1do not intend to go into the post-Moo-
rean discussion about conditional freedom here. 1rather want tp show
why one should assume that there is more than one basic type of free
action. A more detailed analysis of free action is being called foro
A good starting point is Aristotle. According to him, there are two
conditions for free actions: First, the person is aware of what she is doing,
and second, she does not suffer from external coercion (e! NE 1109b-
30ff). Since intentional action is action which is intentional under a
description known by the actor we can skip the first condition (e! As-
combe 1958: 69ft). The Aristotelian conception then boils down to this:
Free action is uncoerced action. It appears very plausible to say that the
absence of coercion is, at leastl a necessary, if not a sufficient condition
of free action. Hencel if Aristotle is right, the analysis oí coercíon ¡SI at
the same time, an ex-negativo-analysis of free aetion. 1 will argue that
there are tlrree different basic types of coercíon and that to each type oí
coercíon corresponds a difierent basic kind oi free action. 1will begin
with the analysis of the different types of coercíon (1-3) and then draw
the implications for any adequate conception of free action (4-5).
1. Types of Coercíon: Interactive and Non-Interactive
Coercían
Consider the following cases:
(1) An earthquake throws person P down to earth;
(2) A boxing champion knocks P out and sends him down to earth¡
(3) Facing a heavy storm the sailors throw their load overboard¡3
(4) Pirates threaten the sailors and thus make them throw their load
overboard.
2 ef Austin 1979: 20Sff; Lehrer 1980: 187ff¡ Frankfurt 1988a: 1ff; Dennett 1984:
131ft.
3 This is, of course, Aristotle's example: cf NE lUOa íf. ef also Hobbes 1839a:
69; 1839b: 197.
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One might be tempted to say that in all four cases somebody is forced
or coerced: in the very broad sense that the person has to accept some-
thing she does not want (or: has to accept something no matter what
she wants). There are, however, sorne important differences. First, in
cases (2) and (4) it is another person which intentionally exerts coer-
cíon¡ in cases (1) and (3) it is not a person but "natural/l events and
conditions of action instead. Second, in cases (1) and (2) something
happens to the person without her being able to influence the events
by her own acting whereas in cases (3) and (4) it is crucíal that the
coerced person acts (he chooses between the options of keeping the
load or throwing ít overboard). Assuming that only persons can be
coerced,4 it seems that we get four types of coercíon, depending on
whether the source oí coercíon is another person or not and depen-
ding on whether the coerced person acts or cannot act:s
The coerced person
does not act does act
The source of coercion
- is no person





It is obvious that ít makes a big dífference whether the coerced per-
son can or cannot acto Furthermore, this makes a big difference as to
the kind oí coercíon and involuntariness involved (as·we shall see).6
But does the other distinction rnake sense? Can a person be coerced by
something that is not a person, e.g., by storms or earthquakes, el (1)
and (3)?
Sure, we say that rocks on the street /1 force/l me to tum around and
change my direction. This is involuntary in the sense that 1would
have preferred to keep on going into the original direction. Without
the rocks on the street we would not talk about coercíon here. But why
not? Couldn't 1argue as welI that the shape of the Iandscape (aH those
mountains) u forces" me to take this u detour/l instead of /1 directly/l appro-
aching the top of the other mountain (as birds can do)? Couldn't 1
argue as weIl that /1 nature/l forces me to stay close to the surface of the
earth most of the time because it has not given me wings? There is no
fundamental difference between the case oí the rocks on the street and
the case of me not having wings to fly. In both cases 1might wish the
facts were different and in both cases the facts are contingent ones. In
4 1 cannot argue for this thesis here and must reIy on íts plausibility.
5 For simplicity's sake, 1 leave cases of overdetermination (seastorm with pirates,
etc.) aside.
6 ef Bayles 1972: 17; Feinberg 1973: 7, 1984: 190ff; Frankfurt 1988b: 26f, 36f;
Gold 1988-9: 115f; Gunderson 1979: 249ft; McCloskey 1980: 336; Wertheimer,
1981: 8ff.
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other words, there are always contingent conditions of adion which
the actor cannot change and which are unwelcome to the actor. It is an
essential trait of action that there always are such conditions. An actor
who could choose the conditions of action at will could aIso simpIy
choose that her goals are realized without acting but then acting
would lose its point. If all this is true, then there is no condition of
action which couId not, in princíple, be regarded as a constraint or a
JI coercíng" factor in the aboye sense. There could be no action that is
not coerced in sorne respect, and aH this for conceptual reasons. Howe-
ver, a concept that is true of everything it can be meaningfully applied
to is of Httle use. OUT concept of coercíon is such that we can truly
apply it only to sorne but not to aH kinds of action. Hence, coercían
must be something different frorn the constraint of conditions of ac-
Hon. Strictly speaking, rocks on the street (or storms or earthquakes)
do not coerce anybody. It is only persons that can exert coercíon. Put-
ting this together with what 1have said aboye -that only persons can
be coerced- we can say that coercíon is something done by a person
(or many persons) to another person (or other persons). The cases (1)
and (3) aboye are not reaIly cases of coercíon?
So, coercíon requires that one person does something that is unweI-
come to another persono But this is not enough. Suppose a car driver
parks ros car in front of a driveway without noticing the driveway. He
thus does something that is unwelcome to another person who wants
to leave the driveway. However, he does not coerce the other person to
stay on the driveway. Many actions have side effects unwelcome to
other persons and not noticed by the adoro It would, again (see above),
not make much sense to consider such actions to be coercíve. To get
back to our example: Coercíon aIso requires that the car driver inten-
tionally blocks the driveway for other drivers or, at Ieastl notices that
he blocks it. Coercíon requires not only that one person ads in a way
that is unwelcome to another person but also that the first person does
so intentionally or is, at least, aware of the effects which are unwelco-
me to the other person.8
AH trus leaves us with two kinds of cases: cases oi type (2) and cases
of type (4). Let us first consider cases like
(2) A boxing champion knocks P out and sends him clown to earth.
Let us suppose that P does not want to go down. The champion then
intentionally coerces Pinto going clown to earth. FurthermoreJ no ac-
tion of P is part of the coercive events. To be sure, Pis still an actor -he
7 Cf. similar: Feinberg 1973: 8f; Nozick 1974: 262ft, 1981: 49J 309, 520. Cf.
however Frankfurt 1988b: 45f. AIso Kant 1902: AA XX, 91ff who holds that
infringements by other persons are worse than other kinds of limitations of a
person's treedom.
6 These remarks are not intended as a definition of the concept of coercíon in
general but rather as a rough explanation -wruch is enough for my purposes here-.
34 IDEAS y VAWRES
COERCION ANO THE VAR[ETIES OF FREE AOJON
can, e.g., insult the champion- but whatever P does has no relevant
effect on the coercíve events. The coercíve events I1happen" to P; in the
relevant respects, P does not count as an actor. This makes a big diffe-
rence to cases like
(4) Pírates threaten the sailors and make them throw theír load over-
board.
It i8 important to see that this kind of coercíon presupposes that the
coerced persons acto The sailors have the choice: they can hand over
their load or keep it (and suffer the consequences). The pirates expect
the sailors to make their decísion and act accordingly -given, of cour-
se, certain limitations of time, knowledge and other resources-. We
can caH cases like (2) cases of"non-interactive coercíon" and cases like
(4) cases of "interactive coercíon". Aristotle held that non-interactive
coercíon is the paradigm case of coercíon (ef NE 1109b, 35ff; EE 1224b,
13ff).9 The following remarks shall also make plausible that interacti-
ve coercíon 1S as much a basic kind of coercíon as non-interactive
coercíon. Apart from that, we shall see that there are two types of
interactive coercíon: threats and offers (of a certain kind). In other
words, we wiU see that there are three basic types of coercíon:
1. non-interactive coercíon
n. interactive coercíon: threats
lII. interactive coercíon: coercíve offers
It does not seem very hard to give an explanation ofthe first type of
coercíon: IfP non-interactively coerces A into Xing then
(a) A'sXingis unwelcome to A (or, at least, AXes no matterwhether
it is welcome to A or not),
(b) A's Xing does not imply any action by A,
(c) P makes A X, knowing that (a) and (b) are the caseJD
It seems harder to give an explanation of the other two types of coer-
cion. Before we can pursue the question of what exactly makes cases I-
III coercíve ones, we need a closer analysis of cases II and III, that is, of
interactive coercíon. Let liS begin with threats and take a closer Iook at
their nature.
2. Threats and Offers
Threats are cases of conditional announcements of intention (verba-
lized or rather implicít). Bere is an example:
If you don't hand over your load we'll make your ship sink!
This is only a threat if the sailors have reason to assume that the
9 Aristotle takes cases like (4) as borderline cases of coercíon (cf. NE lUOa, 4ff),
-with the exception of more extreme threats cf. EE 1224a, lOff-.
10 We do not need (and probably cannot have) a complete reductive definition of
Il non-interactive coercion" here.
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pirates wiU not damage their ship if they hand over the load (ceteris
paribus). Hence, the backwards conditional also belongs to the tlueat
(even though it is usual1y more implicit):
Ifyou hand over your load we won't make your ship sink!
In other words, threats have the form oí a biconditonal (ef Frankfurt
1988b:27f):
p f-7 q,
where IJpJf stands for a possible action oí the threatened person and
11q" for a possible action oí the threatening person. l1 The whole bicon-
ditional is not a descriptive statement about the future (like a predic-
tion or a warning) hut an announcement of an intention.
Threats are more than just announcements of intentions. They are
themselves intentional actions. Ifa person rnakes a threat, then he does
so with the intention that the announcement motivates the other per-
son to behave in a eertain way. Take the aboye example:
Iff you don' t hand over your load we'll make your ship sink!
The pirates make tbis announcement with the intention to motivate
the sailors to hand over their load (instead of risking a fight). Usually,
the threatened person knows trom the eontext which of the altemati-
ves (handing over the load or risking a fight) the threatening person
prefers. And usually, the threatening person knows which oí the alter-
natives the threatened person prefers, -at least if the threat is success-
ful-. Berrce, aH this is cornmon knowledge among the parties even
though it usually is not made explicit. To comply with a threat means
to ehoose the same alternative that the threatening person prefers. P's
threat can only be suecessfuI if hoth sides prefer the same altemative.
In the exampIe aboye the threat is only suecesful if both pirates and
sailors prefer the handing over of the load to the sinking of the ship.
In other words, normal and successful tlueats initiate a three-stage
interaction:
1) P threatens A (/lIt you hand over your load, we won' t sink your
ship!/);
2) A eomplies with the threat by making true the antecedens of the
relevant conditional (hands over the load)
3) P sticks to his declared intention by making the consequens of
the relevant eonditionaI (does not sink the ship) true.
If step 2) does not happen and A does not comply with the threat,
P has two options: either to make or not to make the consequens oí
the relevant conditional (to sink the ship) true. In the last case,.P
cauId either give up tlueatening A ar try a new (usualIy more seve-
re) threat. If step 3) does not happen and P daes not behave as
11 The biconditional is only meant to hold given certaín normalíty conditions. IfJ
for example, a heavy sea storm arrives on the scene, the initial threat rnight lose its
force because it was not meant for such extraordinary cases in the fírst place.
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Jlpromised"12 (takes the load and sinks the ship)¡ the initial threat is
somehow 11defeated" . A normal threat presupposes that P, from be-
ginning to end¡ does¡ in fact, have the intention to do what he announ-
ces.
What has been said so far about threats is also true about offers. If 1
offer you $100 for your old car, then 1make the conditional announce-
ment oí my intention to give you $100 if you give me your old caro
Offers, too¡ have the form of a biconditional: Ifyou do not give me your
old car 1willnot giveyou$100 (ceterisparibus). The person who makes
an ofier does so with the intention that her announcement motivates
the other person to behave in the expected way (hands over the car
instead of keeping it). If an ofier is successful both parties prefer the
same alternative (buy and seU a car). As in the case of threats, offers, ji
successfuL are part of a three-stage sequence (see aboye). So, what is
the difference between threats and offers?
Sorne believe that threats but not offers are coercíve.13 If this should
tuTn out to be true, we would still have to find the relevant difference
between threats and offers in arder to find out what the coercían of
threats consists in. If -as 1 will argue- oifers, too, can be coercive,14
then one might expect coercíon by threats to be different from coercion
by offers. In this case, too, it is necessary to know the relevant differen-
ce between threats and offers. So, what is it? Finding an answer will
also tell liS more about the essential characteristics of threats and offers
and, more generally¡ about coercíon and free action.
Let us caH both threats and offers i/ proposals" .Whether a proposal
by P is a threat or an ofier obivously depends on whether the adressee
A would be better off without the making of the proposal.15 To be more
precise¡ we need to consider four possible cases, aH but one (the actual
one) being counterfactual cases:
a) A accepts the proposal and P acts according to his announce-
ment,
b) A rejects the proposal and P acts according to rus announcement,
c) P gives up rus proposal at sorne stage of the interaction, or
d) P has not made any proposals
12 Cf. Schelling 1960: 36ff, who holds that the threatening person "commits"
herself to do what she announces. Since there i5 no reason to think there is a
normative element involved here, this i5, strictly speaking, not true.
13 Cf Airaksinen 1988; Bayle5 1974: 139f; Gorr 1986: 392·5; McCloskey 1980:
339f.; Nozick 1969: 447ff; Wertheimer 1981: 202, 211, 222ff.
14 Cf. abo: Benditt 1977: 383f; Carr 1988: 63ff; Feinberg 1984: 229ff; Gold 1988-
9: 119; Haksar 1976: 67ff; Held 1972: 49ff; Lyons 1975: 425ff, 1982: 393ff; Stevens
1988: 83, 92ff; VanDe Veer 1977: 374-8; Zimmerrnan 1981: 121ff; Double 1991:
109ft
15 Cf. Nozick 1969: 447 and Frankfurt 1988b: 31f. Nozick's explanation of
11 coercion" contains a norrnative elemento The explanation given here avoids such
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Now, in the case oi an offer the followingis true (supposingthatA is
a rational chooser):16 A is better off in case a) than in case d) and not
worse off in cases b) and c) than in case d). Ifyou trade your old car for
$100 because this is a good deal for you, then you are better off (with
rnoney and withaut car) than you wauld have been without the pro-
posal (with your car and without rny money). Ifyou reject my proposa!
or 1change my rnind and give up my proposal, then you are not worse
off than you would have been without the propasal (in both cases yau
have your car and 1have my maney). Hence, my proposaI "$100 for
your oId car" is an offer.In the case of a threat, however, something
different is true (again supposing that A is a ratianaI chooser): A is
worse off in cases a) and b) than in case d) and neither worse nor better
off in case c) in case d). The sailors are worse off if they hand over their
load than they would have been without the proposaI (if they could
have kept their load). If (case b) the sailors resist the threat, then they
are worse off than they would have beenwithout the propasal (if their
ship would have been safe form attacks). If, finally, the pirates give up
(e.g., because they lose self-confidence), then the sailors are neither
worse nor better off than they would have been without the propo-
sal.17 Hence, the pirates' proposal "Your load or your ship!" is a
threat. Shortly: In the case of offers, A is not worse off with the propo-
sal than without the proposa! (if not better off); in the case of threats, A
is not better off with the proposal than without the proposal (if not
worse off).18 Focussing on the paradigm case a), we"could say that in
the case ofoffers A is typically better off with the proposal than without
the proposal whereas in the case of threats A is typically worse off
with the proposal than without the proposa!. This explains why
threats usually are not welcome to A (whereas offers usually are).19 So
much about the difference between threats and offers. Given aH these
explanations, we are now prepared for taking a closer Iook at the va-
ríeties of coercion.
normative elements. Cf. the critique of Nozick in Baumann 20aOa ch. 6.5. As to
Frankfurt, cf. Baumann 2000b.
16 1will assume here, for the sake oí making the distinction between threats and
offers, that A's choices are rahonal. The distinction of threats and offers i5 explained
in terms of what a raHonal person would do. This does, of course, not mean that
only rational persons can be addressees of threats or offers.
17 Cf. Airaksinen1988: 53ff. For the sake of simplicity, 1 do not take eventual
Schadenjreude or similar factors into account. Nothing essential hinges on this
omíssíon.
18 Cf. for similar explanations: Airaksinen 1988: 31, 47f; Bayles 1974: 139f;
Thalberg 1983: 102f; VanDe Veer 1977: 375; Zimmerman 1981: 124.
19 Cf. Nozick 1969: 460ff; Airaksinen 1988: 33f; BayIes 1974: 141; Stevens 1988:
85. Sometimes a threat might be welcome and an offer unwelcome. The bank
employee might welcome the gangster's threats because it gives him the opportunity
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3. Varieties of Coercion
Consider trus example by Harry Frankfurt (Frankfurt 1988b: 32ff). A
butcher raises his prices; he aks for more money than before. Dnder
these círcumstances we would say that he still makes an offer, -just a
worse one than before-. Offers can be better or worse. But what if we
assume that the butcher has a monopoly on meat, raises rus prices enor-
mously and that his poor c1ient A would have to starve couId he not
afford to buy any meat from him? Given the above explanation, the
butcher's proposal would still be an offer, albeit a very bad one. Some
authors sayitrather is a threat (ef Ibd.). Butwould we, for exampIe,ask
the butcher "Do you want to make a threat?//? I do not thínk so. The
butcher's proposal still is an oHer. But there is a re~son why sorne
authors are inc1ined to see the butcher's proposal as a tlueat: The
butcher coerces rus clients into paying much more than usual. Bis
offer is a coercive one. It is true that aH threats are coercíve (see below)
but trus does not exclude that sorne (but not aH) offers are coercíve, too.
Coercíon comes in different varieties. So, what does the coercíon of
such offers consist in?
Take the example oí the butcher: He exploits the dependency of his
c1ients on meat (ef Haksar 1976: 69). We can say: A coercíve offer is an
offer wruch exploits a dependency of the other persono But consider
the following two variations of the butcher-example" In the first case
the butcher raises his prices because he wants to make as much money
as possible. In the second case it is the raising prices ofhis suppliers/o
and not greed which motivates rus price politics. Ifhe would not raise
rus prices or not to the same degree, then he would ruin his own busi-
ness. In the first but not in the second case the butcher makes a coerci-
ve ofier. What is the difference? WeIl, in the first case he couId afford to
ask for a price which lS much better for rus clients. In the second case
it would be irrational if he would offer his meat for lower prices, -he
would ruin hímself-. In the first case, in contrast, it would not be irratio-
na! (if not even rational) to offer the meat for lower prices, -the butcher
would just make Iess money-. AH this presupposes, of course, that a
person is not irrational because she does not (or does not try to) maxi-
mize her expected subjective utility (d. Slote 1989: 7ff). We can thus
say:
to proof his courage. The teenager might not welcome his parents' offer to bring
bim to the party because he wants to keep bis "cool" image. In such cases, ít is not
the nature of the proposal as such which explains its being welcome or unwelcome
but rather 11additional" factors external to the very nature of the proposal. Benee,
we can disregard such cases here. Cf. Lyons 1975: 425ff; Airaksinen 1988: 87ff.
20 Who themselves may or may not exert coercion on the butcher.
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A coercive offer (ofP to A) is an offer such that
a) P (intentionally) exploits the dependency of A on the offered
goods21 and
b) it would not have been irrational of P to make an offer which is
better for A.22
One could now think of an analogue explanation oí the coercive
character of threats:
Threats are coercive insofar as
a) P (intentionally) exploits sorne dependency of A and
b) it would not have been irrational of P to make a proposal which is
better for A (a less severe threat).
P might threaten A to hand over all his cash ifhe does not want to get
his house bumed down. A depends on keeping his house and P could
have made a less severe threat without thereby being irrational (JlGive
me 10% of your cash or 1'11 step on your toes!If). Hence, P's initial
threat i8 coercive.
However, in the case oí threats 1do not want to stress this aspect oí
coerdon too much because not aH threats are coercive in this way,23
On the other hand threats are always coercive (ef Carr 1988: 60).
Hence, there is another aspect oí coercion which is special to threats
and even fundamental for them. What is it?
Think oí the essential characteristics of threats. A is not better off
and typical1y worse off with the proposal than without the propasa!.
This points to the kind of coercion which is essentiaI to aH threats. In
the paradigm case, P makes A worse off and he does so against A's
will (or no matter what A wants). In other words,
Threats are coercive insofar as P's proposal typically makes A wor-
se off (against A's will, of course), -no matter what A chooses to do-.
To resume: We have distinguished three ways to coerce another per-
son: non-interactive coercion, coercive offers, and threats. What does
aH this tell us about voluntariness and free action?
21 A good is anything that can be offered to somebody. Hence, a good need not
be a material thing.
22 Since dependency and exploitation allow for degrees, the coerciveness of an
offer, too, comes in degrees. This does not mean that any degree oí dependeney
and exploitation makes an offer coercive (then almost every offer would be coercive).
There are, rather, certain thresholds above which the degree oí dependency and
exploitation is high enough to make the offer a coercive one. Furthermore, a hígh
degree of dependency cannot "compensate" for a low degree oí exploitation (and
více versa); both factors must be strong enough (in the example above: The client
must be quite dependent and the exploitation quite severe).
23 Suppose you are lost in the desert and about to die of thirst. Your last chance
arises when another lonely voyager accidentally passes by. He has got lots of water
but he is not willing to share. 1t would be rational of yon to threaten the other
voyager (e.g., with your gun) and make mm hand over sorne water. It would be
irrational to be less "harsh".
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4. Varieties of Voluntariness
Let us begin with a puzzle. Threats and offers are u interactive" forms
of coercion. That is) P presents an altemative to A: uEither you do X
and then 1'11 do Y or you don' t do Xand then 1won't do y! You)ve got
the choice!u. It depends on what A wants (and not on P's wants)
which ofthe alternatives will be realized (to Xornot to X). A isfree to
choose the alternative he prefers mosto The further events depend on
what A wants. In choosing one of the altematives A can act as he wants
to acto The ensuing events would have been different if A would have
chosen differently. In other words, A enjoys freedom of action (el the
explanation at the beginning). Threats and offers do not only not ex-
elude but presuppose voluntariness on the side of the coerced per-
son.24
But isn't this simply inconsistent? Take the case of threats. The foIlo-
wing seems obvious:
1) Threats are coercive;
2) Coerdon implies involuntariness on the side of A.
This seems to exclude what 1have just said:
3) Threats presuppose A's free choice
Since (1) and (2) are almost trivialIy true, it seems that we better skíp
(3) It appears obvious that there is an inconsistency here.25
But not so. Not that the word "free)) is ambigous here. There are,
rather, different respects in which somebody can do something volun-
tarily. Hence, it can be the case that he does something voluntarily in
one respect and involuntariIy inanother respecto Take the case oí threats.
A freely chooses among the alternatives presented; he acts as he wants
too But that he has to make this kind of choice -that there has been a
threat in the first place- has not been freely chosen by A. He would
rather prefer the absence oí any threat because he typically will be
worse off with a threat than without a threat). Hence, insofar as A
cannot help but making this kind of choice, he is not free but coerced
by P. In other words, given the situation A finds himself in, he chooses
and acts freely but A's being in this kind of situation is involuntary
24 Aristotle, NE 1110a, 4ft. has already dealed with the relation between freedom,
voluntariness and coercion. CI al50 Airaksinen 1988: 45; Bayles 1972: 18; 1968:
39ff; Feinberg 1984: 191ff; Steiner 1974-5: 43¡ Mills 1991: 18ff, 58f; Rosenbaum
1986: 107ff. CJ. however also Frankfurt 1988b: 36-8f; 1988a: 2ff; 1988d: 48f. It
might go unnoticed that A chooses freely because it oiten i5 obvious from the
beginning which altemative A will choose. Even if it is overwhelmingly rational to
choose a given option, the choice is still free. The rational person need not be a
person who is unfree to be irrational.
25 Cf Dworkin 1970: 367ff, also Slote 1980: 137f; Stampe/Gibson 1992:1ff¡
Williams 1986: 1ft.
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and coerced (el Frank.furt 1988d: 47ff).26 Similar things are true of
coercive offers: They, too, presuppose that A chooses and acts freely
but at the same time A is coerced into accepting the offer insofar as he
is dependent on doing so. Only non-interactive coercion does not pre-
suppose that A chooses and acts freely.
The upshot of aH tlús is that voluntariness as well as coercion have
more faces than it might seem at first hand. Hence, the relation bet-
ween freedom and coercion is also more complex than one might pri-
maJacie think (ef Cert 1972: 3Off). A person might be doing something
voluntarily in this respect and at the same time be coerced in another
respecto Coercion is a heterogenuous phenomenon. Hence, voluntari-
ness or free action is a heterogenuous phenomenon, too. Correspen-
ding to the above three types of limitation of freedom by coercion we
find the following three types of voluntariness and free action, each
one fulfilling one particular condition en free action:
1. Freedom as the Ability to Aet j The Action Condition: The person's
ability to act according to her wants and preferences is not diminuished
by another person's intentional behavior (the absence of non-interacti-
ve coercion);
n. Freedom as the Absenee oJ Threats j The No-Threat Condition: The
person does not have to ehoose among alternatives proposed by ano-
ther person such that aH oí those alternatives (typically) make her
worse off than she would have been without the proppsal (the absence
of threats);
IIl. Freedom as Non-ExploitationjThe No-Exploitation Condition: The
person does not have to ehoose among a1ternatives proposed by ano-
ther person P sueh that P exploits sorne dependency of her (the absen-
ce of eoercive offers).
Are there more aspects of or conditions on free action? If a) Aristotle
is right in holding that free aetion is uncoerced action (e! NE 1109b,
30ff) and if b) eoercion essentially is an interpersonal relationship and
our three types of eoercion exhaust the basic cases (see above), then e)
free action is action fulfilling the above three conditions 1-lII. This con-
clusion implies that freedom of aetion is essentially social: 1am free to
the degree that no other person acts in a certain way (diminuishes my
ability to act, threatens or exploits me).
But (3) is not quite right. There are cases oí unfree action which are
not cases of coercion (at least, not in the sense proposed above).27 Put
differently, there are still ather conditions far freedom of action than
the ones just indicated. Big roeks lying in my way to the mountain top
26 Why can't A leave the threat-sítuation? Because P coerces him to stay in the
situation, -eíther by non-interactive coerdon (locking the door so that A cannot
leave) or by another threat eH you try to leave 1'11 shoot!")-. 1 cannot (and need
not) go into these complicatons here.
27 For the idea that freedom is the absence of coercion ef Schlick 1930: 105fE.
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do not coerce me to turn around (see above) but they make me unfree to
move as 1want to move (straight ahead to the mountain top). In other
wordsl premise (1) seems cIearly faJse ifwe read JIcoercionll in the sense
proposed above.28 There are thus other cases of unfree (or free) action.
What is the nature of these cases?
Think, againl of the examples given at the beginning:
(1) An earthquake throws person P down to earth;
(2) A boxing champion knocks P out and sends him down to earth;
(3) Facing a heavy storm the sailors throw their load overboard;
(4) Pirates threaten the sailors and thus make them throw their load
overboard.
We can classify these cases as we did befare:
The unfree person
does not act does act
The source of unfreedom
- is no person





The Ifreedom as non-coerciod analysis only covers cases (2) and (4)
but not cases (1) and (3) which also are cases oí lacking freedom of
action. In cases like (1) the person is unfree not to X(which is no aetion
of her own) insofar as
(a) her Xing is unwelcome to her (or, at least, she Xes no matter
whether it is weIcome to her or not),
(b) her Xing does not imply any action by her, and
(e) it is not the case that another person intentionally rnakes the
person X/ knowing that (a) and (b) are the case.29
To put it the other way around, there is thus another type of freedom
and a second JIaction condition" on free action:
IV. Freedom as theAbility toActwithout the JllnterferenceofNatureJr/The
Action Conditíon (2): The person/s ability to act according to her wants
and preferences is not diminuished by sorne natural cireumstances.
Now, what about cases like (3)? In such cases, the person is not free
insofar as
(a) even though the person can act according to her wants and pre-
ferences sorne natural circumstances make the person worse off than
she would have been without those cireumstances (e.go, with no
storm)r -no matter how she chooses to act (e.gor whether she throws the
load over board or keeps it)-;
(b) these cireurnstances take place against the person/s will (or írres-
pective of the person's will);
28 This does not imply that Aristotle is wrong: He has a different concept oí
coercion.
29 Notice the paraUels to the analysis onf non-interactive coercion aboye.
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(e) itis not thecase that another person intentionally produces those
circurnstances, knowing that (a) and (b) are the case.30
To put it the other way around, we get a further type of free action as
well as a further condition on free action:
V. Freedom as the Absence of11Unpleasant Circumstances"/The Circums-
tance Condition: The person does not have to act under unwelcorne
natural circumstances oí action.
This completes the analysis of and the distinction between the difie-
rent types of free aetion. There are social (l-III) as well as non-social
(IV-V) kinds of free action: sorne having to do with other person's
behavior and sorne not. The rnain focus of this paper is the relation
between freedorn and coercían: to show that there is one and to indica-
te what it is. This contributes to a more differentiated view of free action.
Very often, philosophers tend to focus on just one aspect of free action
and to neglect the other ones. Many compatibilists, for exarnple, think
of freedom as freedom of type IV (or 1). Hobbes is a good example:
JlLiberty, or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition;
by opposition, 1mean external impediments to motion [...]" (Hobbes
1839b: 196). One need, of course, not be an incompatibilist to allow for
more and different types of freedom. And one should -whether com-
patibilist or not- al10w for more. Otherwise, one's conception of free-
dorn is deficient.
5. Full Freedom, Restricted Freedom, and Overall Freedom
I conclude with sorne remarks on the relations between the different
aspects or types of free action. In a strict and full sense, no action is free
if not aH of the five conditions above are fulfilled. Insofar, the meeting
of each of the five conditions is a necessary condition of free action.
Since there is no reason to assume that our analysis is incornplete, we
can add that it also is sufficíent for freedom of action:
Full Freedom: An action Ís free (in the strict sense) iff conditions I-V
are fulfilled.
Conditions II, III and V determine whether sorne given action is done
freely or unfreely. The two sailor's examples from the beginning ((3)
and (4)) are exarnples of actions (throwing away the load) done unfre-
ely. Conditions 1and IV (the íI action conditions"), incontrast, determi-
ne whether a person is free or unfree to do sorne particular action -that
is, whether a person is able to perform sorne particular action if she
wants to and to refrain froro sorne particular action if she does not
want to perfonn it-. The two falling-down examples from the beginning
30 This case not only parallels case (4) above but also the case of threats in
particular. There seems to be no parallel, however, to the case of offers. 1cannot go
into the reasons here why this ís so.
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((1) and (2)) are cases of not being free to do sorne particular action (to
remain standing on one's own feet). There is thus an important diffe-
rence between acting freely and being free to act. Both are part of what
1call H free action" here. So, one should carefully distinguish between
free action, acting freely and being free to acto
What are the relations between acting freely and being free to act? If
somebody is performing sorne action freely, then necessarily he is free
to perform that action. If1freely raise my arm, my raising the arm i8 an
action oí mine wmch is neither motivated by a threat nor by a coercive
offer norby nasty círcumstances. It is motivated and caused by rny desire
to raise the arm and if1would not have desired to do that 1would not
have done it. Ifmy arm would have gone up whatever my motivatio-
nal states (e.g., because of sorne nervous reflex or somebody else pus-
hing my arm), the raising of rny arrn would not have been an action oí
mine. Intentional action as such presupposes that the person is free to
perform the aetion; otherwise the person's behavior would not consti-
tute an action of hers at al1.31 Hence, acting at aH and, afortiori, acting
freely presupposes being free to acto
The reverse ís not true: Sornebody might be free to perform sorne
action which he does not do freely (in the sense of conditions n, III
and V). The sailors in the exarnples above are free to throw away
the load but if they throw it away they do not do it freely. Acting
freely presupposes being free to act but being free-to act (unfortu-
nately) does not presuppose acting freely. Benee, the action con-
ditions of free actions are the fundamental ones. Being free to act
is the basic component oí free action; acting freely is less funda-
mental.32
AH this irnplies that a person rnight enjoy sorne aspects of free-
dom of action but not aH of thern. In a less strict and more restricted
sense, a person can be free in sorne respect (conditions 1and IV are
fulfiIled) but not in aH respects (not aH of the conditions II, III and V
are fulfilled). The person might be free to perform sorne action but
she might be doing it under the impact oí sorne threat, of sorne coer-
cive ofier, of sorne nasty circumstance or oí any combination of
31 If somebody else raises my arm against my wilt the raising of my arm is not
an action of mine but an act of the other person, If the raising oí my arrn is not
against my will but still does not happen because 1 want it but rather because
sorne other person wants it, the raising of my arm is also not an action of mine but
rather an act of the other persono Even íf rny arm would have also gone up without
the other person's intervention -because 1wanted it to go up-, the raising oí rny
afm is not an action of mine but still an act of the other persono Hence} we can
disregard aH these cases here. Apart from that, 1cannot go mto the details of action
theory here. ef as an example for the kind oí causal theory of action that 1 use here:
Davidson 1980: 63ff.
32 This does, of course} not mean that acting freely can be reduced to being free
to act.
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these. This explains how one can solve the puzzle from the begin-
ning of this section. It makes sense to ca11 these cases cases of JI restric-
ted freedornN :
Restricted Freedom: An action is free (in a less striet sense) iff conditio-
ns 1and IV are fulfilled but not aH of the conditions JI, nI and V, -that
is, if the person is free to do the action but is not doing it freely-.
Bence, full freedom and restricted freedom exclude each other. A
free action is either free in the full sense or in the restrieted sense.
Finally, one should not forget that we are talking about particular
action tokens here. Since a person performs many different actions,
she rnight be free with regard to one action and not free with regard to
another action. It is unrealistic to assume that a person could be free
with regard to a11 of her actions. My raising of rny arm might be free in
the striet sense but not my paying the taxes. Hence, it is of sorne interest
to see which of our actions are free or unfree and in what sense. Fur-
thermore, we surely have good reasons to care in particular about the
freedom oí our more important actions. It is thus useful to have a con-
cept oí "overaIl freedom Jl :
Overall Freedom: A person enjoys more overall freedom if more rather
than less of her actions are free; a person enjoys more overall freedom
if she is free wíth regard to the actions important to her rather than to
the actions not important to her.33
Overall freedom characterizes persons with respect to their actions
and not their actions. And, obviously, it comes in degrees.
So much about the varieties of free action.34 1wanted to distinguish
between different kinds of free action and get a bit clearer about the
relations between them. This is of sorne importance because many
philosophers tend to assurne that there is just one single and homoge-
nuous kind of freedom called JI freedom of action". The analysis of
different types of coercion led to a different view on freedom -a view
which stresses the many faces of free action-.35
33 There are many problems with the idea of counting actions as well with
measuring importance. Apart from that, it is hard to see how one should weigh
quantity and importance against each other. Fortunately, 1 do not have to go into
these intricate problems for 1 onIy want to present a rough idea of overall freedom
here. For more details, ef Swanton, 1979: 337ff.
34 As 1said in the beginning: 1 am only dealing here with the freedom of action,
not with freedom of the will. What has been said here must be taken with this
restriction.
35 For cornments on thís paper or on former versions of it 1 would like to thank
Friedhold Baumann, Monika Betzler, Wolfgang Carl, Gisela Cramer, Richard
Eldridge, Martín Gierl, Julian Nida-Rümelin, and two anonymous referees.
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